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This research will attempt to evaluate how the thinking of Floridi, especially 
his emphasis on information, could in some way affect the way we approach 
art practice. It rests upon an existing body of study about art practice, 
pursued through a selective literature review of the works of Floridi. 
As artists rediscover the notion of participation, stemming from our growing 
awareness of our informational environments, we see an increasing need for 
models and terminologies from theories of information to help us design and 
manage our informational being. 
This study will take the form of desk research in the sense that I will be 
analysing documents relating to Floridi and art. A breakdown of the key 
components will be made from selected literature of Floridi with the aim of 
clarifying some of the terms and concepts used and seeing whether it is 
applicable to art.  
Following a Floridian perspective, we find that Art exists as part of what 
helps us interpret our existence within a universal informational 
environment that is negotiated by informational entities that includes, 
amongst other things, conscious informational organisms and possibly 
artificial informational agents. 
As we see more projects using new technology to analyse data from 
collections, information professionals are in a unique position to take 
advantage of this interest in data and information. 
Furthering the awareness of Floridi’s informational approach amongst those 
in the arts sector could be the first step in creating greater connections 
between the library and information science and art. In doing so, we could 
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One of the most fascinating arguments coming to light in the early part of 
this century is the view that we humans negotiate a universal informational 
environment with other informational entities, many of which are 
increasingly artificial creations.  
 
The philosophical issues raised by Luciano Floridi, and the subsequent 
construction of a Principia Philosophiae Informationis (see Floridi, 2013, 
p.xiv) is perhaps one of the timeliest philosophical efforts in our 
progressively digital era. His writings surrounding the idea of an infosphere 
and our informational ethics has given practitioners within the field of 
Library and Information Science and Information Technology much to 
consider (Bawden and Robinson, 2018, p.2-5). As we become more reliant 
on connected digital devices throughout our daily lives, Floridi has 
highlighted how this reliance has led us to “reinterpret who we are and how 
we should interact with each other” (Floridi 2014, p.166). 
 
The rise of Information and Communication Technologies from the twentieth 
century has shaped profoundly the ways in which we live our lives (see 
Floridi, 2010b, p.xi). The methods and concepts from computer science 
have already been developed and applied to much philosophical thinking 
(see Floridi, 2011, p.16). Nevertheless, Floridi believes that it is “preferable 
to speak of an informational era rather than a computational era, because 
it is the increasingly pervasive and ever more important life-cycle of 
information… that deeply affect both individual and societal well-being” 





Within the field of art, there has been many attempts from the post-war 
periods of the Twentieth century to link scientific and informational 
theories with art theory and practice. In the United Kingdom, there were 
artists inspired by encounters with cybernetic thinking, where boundaries 
which were traditionally considered as given were now viewed as human 
constructions (see Hayles, 1999, p.84). 
 
Whilst artists working with computers (later evolving into art practice 
labelled as digital art), produced results which are often seen as an obvious 
link between art and information theory. Yet computers and computing are 
only a small part of the infosphere (see Floridi, 2015b, p.21). The effects of 
information theory and its close cousin, cybernetic theories, have 
influenced artists from a variety of backgrounds. It is for these reasons that 
the focus of this research will be based primarily around artists working with 
analogue data. 
 
This research will attempt to evaluate how the thinking of Floridi, especially 
his emphasis on information, could in some way affect the way we approach 
art practice. It rests upon an existing body of study about art practice, 
pursued through a selective literature review of the works of Floridi. It 
builds upon these prior explorations by aiming to situate art practice in 
relation to contemporary informational theories and suggesting the way we 
view contemporary art practice needs to move beyond existing theories.  
 
The title of this project is an adaption of a seminal performance piece title 
by Joseph Beuys, namely Wie man dem toten Hasen die Bilder erklärt 
(1965); one of seven iconic pieces recreated by the artist Marina Abramović 
as a way of archiving and preserving such ephemeral presentations (see 





2 Aims, objectives, scope and definitions 
 
2.1 Aims and Objectives  
 
This project aims to review Floridi’s concept of information as a model for 
art theory. There is also a lesser secondary aim of finding examples of art 
that operate in a way that could be said to model or counter Floridi’s ideas. 
Key questions include: 
 
 What are the themes and concepts of Floridi’s philosophy? 
 How do they relate to contemporary art practice? 
 How could Floridi’s philosophy influence future art practice? 
 
The objectives of this project are as follows: 
 
 To identify aspects of Floridi’s concepts and ideas and analyse them 
to determine the key themes and potential problems; 
 
 To compare and contrast the concepts and ideas of Floridi with 
theories and ideas from the field of art as it has been practiced from 
the late 20th century to its present day; 
 
 To establish whether a focus on the ideas and concepts of Floridi 
could influence the development of art practice and whether this is 











During the latter half of the Twentieth century, information and cybernetic 
theories provided the language and models that bridged a perceived gap 
between art and society.  
As artists rediscover the notion of participation, stemming from our growing 
awareness of our informational environments, we see an increasing need for 
models and terminologies from theories of information to help us design and 
manage our informational being. “[T]hey may also serve as powerful 
pedagogic and cultural tools for the transmission of key insights and 
understandings to succeeding generations” (Scott, 2004, p.1367). 
There are several papers that look at the development of information theory 
and art, though the majority focus on its relation to the development of 
computer art or net art and the digital art that follows.  
In terms of the writings of Floridi, I will start my investigation from some of 
his earliest texts dating back to the mid-1990s, working my way through his 
published writings before delving further into his journal articles. At this 
stage, I will only be surveying works that are written in the English 
language.  
For the initial part of this study, which draws attention to the usage of 
information through cybernetic theories in the latter part of the Twentieth 
century, we shall follow the advice of Gordon Pask and distinguish the 
fundamental basics of cybernetics as a study of systems through the notions 
of regulation and information flow.  
The following provides a working definition of information and art as it will 




2.2.2.1 What is information? 
 
“Decades of research have shown no consensus or even 
convergence on a single, unified definition of information” 
(Floridi, 2016c, p.2). 
 
The adoption of information and cybernetic theories has had a major 
impression on the rise of computer-related art practices. The influence of 
Max Bense’s information aesthetics is well documented (see Giannetti, n.d. 
and Nake, 2012, p.65-67). Within the field of more traditional fine art, 
information theories made a brief yet barely visible contribution. 
 
Floridi has recommended five authors for those interested in a more in-
depth look into information theory (see Floridi, 1999, p.ix). It is, however, 
worth noting that the difference between information from the perspective 
of a mathematical theory of communication and that of semantic 
information “is comparable to the difference between a Newtonian 
description of… a car accident and the description of the same accident by 
the police” (Floridi, 2016d, p.44). 
 
Authors of more accessible introductions to information theory and its 
history are suggested in Floridi (2014, p.221). Referencing his own 
contribution to the debate about what information in general might be, 
Floridi has provided a list of four articles in Floridi (2011, p.82). Also 
suggested are six researchers from the 1970s to the late 1990s which point 








Of those who tried to formulate a theory of information, Donald 
MacCrimmon MacKay’s attempt deserves a mention. The important 
distinction brought about by MacKay was briefly explained by N. Katherine 
Hayles (see Hayles, 1999, p.18-19, p.54-46, p.63-64).  
 
 
Unlike the mathematical theories of communication stemming from the 
United States, MacKay’s concept of “information was not opposed to 
change; it was change” (Hayles, 1999, p.64). To MacKay, a message is only 
meaningful if “the receipt of the message would alter the conditional 
readiness of action” (Winning and Bechtel, 2016, p.355). His theory “implied 
that the goal was not a fixed point but was a changing series of values that 
varied with context” (Hayles, 1999, p.64). This notion is repeated by 
Gregory Bateson, though a little more radically in that, expectation is 
enough as the context (see Lutterer, 2005, p.500). Floridi views Bateson’s 
better known saying, that information is the “difference that makes a 
difference” (see Hayles, 1999, p.51, also Scott, 2004, p.1369), as a less 
accurate version of MacKay’s notion of information as a distinction that 
makes a difference (see Floridi, 2010a, p.23). 
 
 
The definitions we will use in this paper will therefore vary from the notion 
of information as something transmitted, when discussing the earlier models 
of cybernetics adoption, to the Floridian notion of information as a reality 







2.2.2.2 What is art? 
 
 
There are as many, if not more, definitions of art as there are, theories of 
information and it is therefore the task of this section to determine how the 
term ‘art’ is to be used in this research. 
 
From a Platonic perspective (Floridi admitted that he was formerly a 
classicist (Floridi, 2018d)), art is a form of imitation and thus it is far from 
the notions of truth (see Coeckelbergh, 2017, p.290). Likewise, Aristotle 
believed that we were born to imitate, and humans should be seen as 
“imitative beings” (Coeckelbergh, 2017, p.290). 
 
In the Western romantic point of view, art is an expression of your inner self 
(see Coeckelbergh, 2017 p.289-290). Mark Coeckelbergh (Ibid., p.289-290) 
has pointed out that, more importantly, this viewpoint has developed the 
idea that “there is an origin… and a work of art is original if it is connected 
to that origin.” This emphasis has filtered across the Modern period with 
artists in the Twentieth century looking for ways to challenge the idea of art 
as being about creative artists (Ibid., p.289-290). 
 
Of the many different art movements of the Twentieth century, the 
conceptual movement has championed the notion that instead of engrossing 
the viewer aesthetically or emotionally, art could engage them in an 
intellectual process (see Goldie and Schellerkens, 2007b, p.ix). Thus, 
philosophical theories “have served not only as an inspiration, but, at times, 
even as a source of authority and justification for the work performed by 







Compared with other forms of art at the time, the works of conceptual 
artists were not limited to specific techniques or art medium, and neither 
could they be categorized according to a typical genre (see Goldie and 
Schellerkens, 2007b, p.x). The curatorial work of Lucy Lippard has been 
most influential in defining such works in terms of its dematerialization of 
the art object, to borrow the title of her now famous book (Lippard, 1973). 
 
Like most art projects of this period, art is qualified by what Arthur Danto 
has termed ‘the art world’ (see Danto, 1964). This, in turn, has given rise to 
George Dickie’s contextualist theory of art (see Lopes, 2007, p.241). Of the 
criticisms against such practices, James Young has argued that they have 
“become ‘semantically enfranchised’ by a discourse… [and] cannot be 
understood… except in conjunction with what is said about them” (Goldie, 
2007, p.165). 
 
It is within this idea of a discourse-dependent art, stemming from the post-
war period to its present day, that we will begin our journey. The term art, 
as used in this paper, will not be limited to any particular style, practice or 
shared qualities other than the fact that something, whether it is physical, 





3 Survey of Available Literature  
 
This section will offer a preliminary outline of some of the materials 
available prior to the main investigation itself, which consists of a review of 
selected literature by Floridi and art.  
 
 
3.1 Art resources  
 
In terms of resources relating to discourse-dependent art practice, the 
Vancouver Art Gallery library was approached for resources relating to Lucy 
Lippard’s seminal exhibition 955,000 (1970). Lippard is often cited as an 
important figure in the understanding of artists working from a discourse-
dependant perspective of Conceptual Art (see Goldie and Schellerkens, 
2007b, p.xi and Cook, 2016, p.15-16).  
 
Stephen Willats wrote extensively about his homeostatic models of art, as 
well as providing a platform for artists to discuss and disseminate ideas 
surrounding information and cybernetic theories in relation to art. His 
journal, titled Control, will provide ample material for clarifying earlier 
approaches to information from a decidedly British perspective. 
 
As of equal importance are the social system theories of Niklas Luhmann. 
His Art as Social System (2000), provides an interesting development in 
information and systems theories. 
 
The writings of Dominic McIver Lopes, including articles edited by Floridi 
(which I will come to later), would help reveal the sources of Floridi’s 
approach to digital art practice. 
 
Likewise, the work of Margaret Boden on creativity from a computational 






Finally, Philosophy and Conceptual Art (Goldie and Schellerkens (eds.), 
2007a), which brings together both Lopes and Boden, in a volume that will 
provide the foundations of how discourse-dependant art is to be approached 
in relation to philosophy. 
 
 
3.2 Floridian resources  
 
With regards to a list of available literature by Floridi, the first source of 




During the initial phase of this project, I noticed the listing of “Aesthetics 
between the wars: Art and liberation” as a chapter in the Cambridge History 
of Philosophy (see Floridi, 2008d) written by Floridi. As the book itself listed 
Floridi’s contribution as “The renaissance of epistemology”, his assistant 
was contacted for verification. It was later confirmed that Floridi was 
indeed the author of “The renaissance of epistemology” and was not 
involved in the writing of “Aesthetics between the wars” (At the time of 
submission, the webpage has changed to “Sensible appearances” by M. 
Martin, of which Floridi was also not involved in writing).  
 
 
Due to its inaccuracies, I decided to seek an alternative source of available 
literature. Floridi maintains his own website (www.philosophyofinformation.net), 
but the list of publications is very selective. I later found two sources that 
appeared to be most useful: the citations page of Google Scholar and 









The amount of material discovered meant that a change in strategy was 
needed to navigate the wealth of information available. 
 
Worldcat, the global catalogue of library collections mentions Tutto 
Leonardo a Milano (1988) as one of the first books with text by Floridi. 
Although such a book is certainly of interest, the subject matter, year of 
publication and its lack of availability in the United Kingdom meant that I 
was required to find an alternative starting point. 
 
 
The first piece of text reviewed in this project was Floridi’s PhD thesis from 
the University of Warwick (Floridi, 1990). Although the content is extremely 




Scepticism and the foundation of epistemology (Floridi, 1996) contains an 
interesting analysis of Karl Popper’s theory of knowledge (Floridi, 1996, 
p.112-116 and p.291-307). The book itself is based on revised versions of his 
MPhil thesis and journal articles. This point was useful in deciding how I 
should approach the rest of his works, as his books on information also 
consist of revised peer-reviewed journal articles.  
 
 
Philosophy and Computing (Floridi, 1999) provides one of the first insights 
into the beginning of what would become the philosophy of information (see 











Sextus Empiricus (Floridi, 2002) is in the genre of a history of philosophy 
with an aim “to map out the history of Pyrrhonism” (Floridi, 2002, p.viii). It 


















Floridi provides a useful diagram showing how his books on information 
relate (see Figure 1). Information (Floridi, 2010a) and later, The 4th 
Revolution (Floridi, 2014), thus provide an introduction to the series, with 
the former mapping out what is meant by the term ‘information’ (see 
Floridi, 2010a, p.2). The Philosophy of Information (2011) lays down the 
“conceptual foundations of the series” (Floridi, 2011, p.xii). Readers 
interested in the list of 22 journal articles which the book is based should 
refer to Floridi (2011, p.xvi).  
 
 






The Ethics of Information (2013) “investigates the foundations of the ethics 
of informational organisms” (Ibid., p.xiv). The 39 journal articles that 
constitute this book are listed at Floridi (Ibid., p.xviii-xix). 
 
 
Floridi (2011) and Floridi (2013) have been described as philosophically 
Germanic in that they are written in the perspective of a “post-analytic-
continental divide” (Floridi, 2013, p.xiv).  
 
 
Figure 1 suggests that initially, his Principia Philosophiae Informationis was 
to be in four volumes. This is also mentioned in Floridi (2013, p.xiv). During 
the Digital Life Symposium at Exeter College (Floridi, 2018d) however, 
Floridi mentioned that his work on information would end with The 
Hermeneutics of Information. This was confirmed by a tweeted image 
showing what is called The Foundations of the Philosophy of Information 














Figure 2: The first 3 volumes on The Foundations 






The Logic of Information (forthcoming) will not be reviewed in this project. 
 
Of the books edited by Floridi, there are six that have been selected due to 
their contents: 
 
The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information 
(Floridi, ed., 2008a) contains, amongst other things, a chapter on Digital Art 
by Dominic McIver Lopes (Lopes, 2008, pp.106-116). 
 
Similarly, Katherine Thomson-Jones provides a chapter on “Art and the 
information society” in The Routledge handbook of philosophy of 
information (Floridi, ed., 2016b). 
 
The other titles reviewed in this project includes chapters from: Philosophy 
of computing and information: 5 questions (Floridi, ed., 2008c); The 
Cambridge handbook of information and computing ethics (Floridi, ed., 
2010b) and; The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era 
(Floridi, ed., 2015a). 
 
Only the most relevant articles from Philosophy and Technology, a peer-
reviewed journal edited by Floridi, were explored for this project. This 
includes the special issue of Philosophy and Technology titled ‘Rethinking 
Art and Aesthetics in the Age of Creative Machines’ (2017). 
 
The literature suggested above will thus form the starting point from which 







This study will take the form of desk research in the sense that I will be 
analysing documents relating to Floridi and art. A breakdown of the key 
components will be made from selected literature of Floridi with the aim of 
clarifying some of the terms and concepts used and seeing whether it is 
applicable to art.  
 
A selected historical study will be made examining the development of 
issues surrounding art practice of the period described above. According to 
Pickard (2007, p.168), such historical analysis is concerned with 
reconstructing the past, identifying pieces of a puzzle and putting them 
together to provide insight and understanding of a situation.” Likewise, this 
phase of the project will not be a comprehensive survey of all avenues of 
art practice but a piecing together of parts that could potentially be 
compared with Floridi’s concepts.  
 
The reasons behind this choice of methods is that the former will provide 
the conceptual understanding for the second phase of research, whilst the 
latter will help establish a space in which the former could be applied. It is 
envisaged that any assumptions made will be open-ended. The skills 
required in implementing this project will include information seeking and 






5 Review of Art and Floridi 
 
5.1 The steersmen of Serendip 
 
In 1965, Jasia Reichardt was encouraged by Professor Max Bense to organise 
an exhibition exploring “the connections between new art forms, and the 
uses of computers” (Reichardt, 1968b, p.3). Reichardt subsequently 
gathered together a group of consultants, including Mark Dowson, who 
became the project’s technology adviser (Ibid, p.4). Dowson was leading 
“the design and development of complex teaching/learning systems” for 
Systems Research Ltd., a research company directed by Gordon Pask (Ibid, 
p.4). 
 
Figure 3: Cybernetic Serendipity poster (ICA, 1968). 
 
The exhibition, Cybernetic Serendipity, had taken three years to prepare 
and became the second show at the newly opened Carlton House Terrace 
address of the Institute of Contemporary Art in London (see Institute of 
Contemporary Art, n.d., p.1). Studio International provided a catalogue in 
the shape of a special issue of its magazine; though much of its content was 




The show was divided into three sections: the first, a show of computer-
generated graphics, music and computer animated film; second was the 
show of painting machines and remote-control robots; and the third, dealt 
with the history of cybernetics through a display of machines (Reichardt, 
1968b, p.1). Contemporary accounts revealed that it received a mixed 
reception: comments ranged from those who were interested in the history 
of computing to refutations of the show as an exhibition of art (see BBC, 
1968). 
 
In the summer of 1969, a year after the exhibition closed in London, an 
article by Michael Apter (1969) attempted to establish the value of applying 
cybernetics to the analysis of visual art. Apter started with the idea that 
works of art may be categorized as a “complex dynamic system” which in 
certain ways, appears “similar to the functioning of a developing organism” 
(Apter, 1969, p.263). He explained that an understanding of the information 
flow of this system may help practitioners improve their technique.  
 
Examples were given, covering the idea of influencing the acceptance of 
machines as art; machine creating art; and art existing as a process. It ends 
with a rather unexpected suggestion: proposing that it may be the case that 
cybernetics itself is an art form (Apter, 1969, p.264). A definition of art was 
never actually offered by Apter, other than its implied meaning through 
suggestions of aesthetic fulfilment in the models produced for science.  
 
In the following decade, one of the most noticeable demonstrations 
concerning the influence of cybernetic and informational theories could be 
found in the projects of Stephen Willats. Willats practice included social 
investigations, theoretical models and traditional exhibition displays. His 
writings were published in a series of books but were mainly collected in a 




5.2 Art and social function 
 
“The shift away from a Machine Age Culture towards the 
Cybernated age leaves the artist in the position where change 
in the areas of operation… becomes essential… Hence the 
artist might find his role as the programmer of areas of 
randomness triggering creative behaviour, the audience 
becoming all important and not just an afterthought” (Willats, 
1968). 
 
Control was brought together by like-minded artists to “rethink the artists’ 
relation to society” (Willats, 1968). The journal (first published in 1965) 
began as a vehicle for presenting participatory artworks and earlier issues 
were heavy influenced by behavioural and social sciences. Our interest here 
lies in issues printed after 1970, which contain articles by various 
contributors with emphases on thoughts about art practice and the adoption 
of cybernetic and informational theories.  
 
Jack Burnham’s influence through his use of Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s 
general systems theory is apparent throughout issue six, printed in 1971. An 
article by artist Stroud Cornock points at Burnham’s remarks as a sign of a 
“growing acceptance of… ‘systems approach’” in art (Cornock, 1971).  
 
Cornock’s intention was to establish the function of art as a system by 
drawing distinctions between static values and dynamic relationships. For 
Cornock, art as system must operate autonomously from the envelope of the 
art market. He identified four different communication models which lay 










The first model demonstrates where the organisational dependence of the 
piece of art includes part of the environment. To clarify, Cornock 
differentiates the indeterminate factors which affect such art from the likes 
of certain kinetic art, where the function is established by factors inherent 
in the result of an artist’s labour (Cornock, 1971).  
 
 




Cornock’s second model treats participants as “basic switches” (Cornock, 
1971): the dependent relationship between the viewer and the artefact is 
represented as a simple feedback loop. In such pieces, the information flow 
between the artist and the artefact is restricted once it is displayed. This 
category is perhaps the most familiar example of audience involvement. We 










Figure 4: The dynamic artwork as a system (adapted from Cornock, 1971). 





5.2.3 The participatory artwork as a system 
 
There is a similarity between the participatory model and the reciprocal 
model. Only here, the information flows are between agents. The histories 
of such audience participations are often filled with illusions of free 
expressions – an example would be the facial punch received by Joseph 
Beuys during one of his Aktions (see Abdullah, 2016). Since the structures of 
these events are often predetermined, a genuine space does not exist for 
artists and participants to be mutually creative. Cornock narrows this 
definition by suggesting that the flow of information is therefore between 
the participants and “a matrix” (Cornock, 1971).  
 
5.2.4 The interactive artwork as a system 
 
The last model is perhaps the most challenging. Cornock speculates that the 
artist could be disregarded once the matrix has been specified through the 
anticipation of a learning system. This is made possible through the idea of 
homeostatic principles.  
 
“Homeostasis is defined… as the ability of an organisation 
(system) to maintain itself in a stable state of equilibrium, 
given a change in some dependent condition, from either 
within its own fabrication or that of its environment” (Willats, 
1974, p.11). 
 
The Artist as an Instigator of Changes in Social Cognition and Behaviour 
(Willats, 1973) expanded on many of the ideas presented in the pages of 
Control. Willats believed that in order to escape the commodification of 
art, the artist should encourage mutual engagement with a wider audience 
(Ibid., p.1). By analysing social constructs, the artist could perform catalytic 




constructor of models, the artist would operate outside of the institutional 
framework as the art now requires a complex system of interactivity (Ibid., 
p.1).  
 
Willats devised a series of diagrams 
demonstrating the possible state of 
change in such speculative systems. The 
model consists of nodes, each of which 
represents a changing value capable of 
affecting the relationship of other 
nodes. The flow of information, 
indicated by the arrows, is of 
importance because the artist cannot 
presume an equal frame of reference 
between participants and themselves 
(see Willats, 1973, p.26). 
 
The basis of Willats’ theories is borrowed from the thinking of the 
celebrated cyberneticist Gordon Pask. Unlike Willats, Pask believed that life 
exists in the conflict between closed constructions and open interaction 
(see Rocha, 1996). 
 
Pask gave a talk on Joy and Innovation at Cybernetic Serendipity and 
exhibited an interactive mobile that was designed “for an aesthetically 
potent environment of a sociological type” (Pask, 1968). The exhibit relied 
“heavily upon lessons learned in connexion with Musicolour”, a cybernetic 
model from one of his earlier projects (Ibid.).  
 
His lesser-known theory for the study of interaction (see Zeeuw, 2001, 
p.978 and Pask and Zeeuw, 1992, p.11), is of importance to this paper and 
we will look further into this at a later stage.  
Figure 6: Possible states of change in 








“[Human beings] are homeostatic information patterns, bent on 
resisting all forms of entropy, thermodynamic and metaphysical” 
(Floridi 2013, p.310). 
 
 
It is perhaps a sign of things to come that Floridi’s doctoral thesis at 
Warwick University opens with fragments from text-based displays by the 
artist Jenny Holzer. The inscriptions were part of an exhibition organised by 
the Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam in 1990 (see Floridi 1990). That same 
year, Holzer became the first woman to be the sole representative in the US 
pavilion at the Venice Biennale which was awarded the coveted Leone d'Oro 
for Best Pavilion (see Caruth, 2008).  
 
 





“… the reason goes back to 1982, when I played on the 
electronic billboard in Times Square, thanks to Jane Dickson 
and the Public Art Fund. That’s when it dawned on me that 
large active displays are perfect for public address.” Jenny 
Holzer (Madoff and Holzer, 2003, p.238) 
 
 
Floridi was undoubtedly aware of art exhibitions from the early stages of his 
academic career and despite what was to become the start of a global 
economic decline, Holzer’s work, like many New York based artists of the 
time, mirrored the “slickness and surface” of the 80’s era (Harrison, 2003, 
p.82). Towards the end of the 90’s, having written several guides on 
computing and the internet for philosophers in Italian and in English (see 
Floridi, n.d.), Floridi was to start on what was to become a Philosophy of 
Information (Floridi, 2011, p.xii). 
 
Art has been mentioned in passing throughout his writings, though in most 
occasions, references are made to more historical artistic efforts: 
 
“As a simple example, we could study the presence or absence 
of the two popular figures of Heraclitus, the weeping 
philosopher, and Democritus, the laughing philosopher… the 
patterns becomes even more interesting once we notice that 
during the seventeenth century the two Greek philosophers 
were portrayed in many Dutch paintings” (Floridi, 1999, p.108). 
“Computers may never fail to read a barcode correctly, but 
cannot explain the difference between a painting by Monet and 




“[P]hilosophers are more akin to individual explorers of the 
depths, and are more likely to proceed by removing rather than 
augmenting, reminding one of Michelangelo’s definition of 
sculpture, the art of ‘taking away’” (Floridi 2014, p.21). 
 
In Philosophy and Computing (Floridi, 1999), Floridi compares the 
perception of databases with the definition of art from Plato’s Republic, 
(Ibid., p.110). Floridi describes this “aesthetic approach” as a form of naïve 
realism, where “only physical entities and their perceptible properties are 
genuinely and authentically real” (Ibid., p.110).  
 
Digital art is mentioned in The Ethics of Information (2013, p.172-173), 
referencing an article by D.M. Lopes from the Blackwell Guide to the 
Philosophy of Computing and Information (Lopes, 2008), S. Mealing’s book 
on Computers and Art (2002) and Janet Murray’s Hamlet on the Holodeck 
(1998), which, as the title suggests, is more about narrative works in a 
digital environment.  
 
Floridi reasoned that “if a computer can produce Picasso-like pictures… - 
albeit routinely by digitizing a photo… and then processing an abstraction of 
it – then… at least Picasso’s… originality is inimitable” (Floridi, 2013, p.173).  
 
Of chapters where the main topic was not exclusively about art, within the 
books edited by Floridi, Jean-Gabriel Ganascia mentioned Walter 
Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
(Ganascia, 2015, p.81). He spoke of a digital aura that would be useful in 
interpreting generative art, where evaluation is only possible “with respect 
to the number of possibilities that a program can generate” (Ganascia, 









In 2016, Floridi was a keynote speaker at the 56th annual conference of the 
British Society of Aesthetics (BSA). His presentation was listed as ‘The 
Beautiful Glitch’ on the society’s website, although Floridi also refers to it 
as ‘The Informational Nature of a Work of Art’ (see Floridi, 2016a). While no 
known recordings exist of the proceedings, the society was able to provide a 
photograph of the BSA Vice President, Dr Stacie Friend with Floridi standing 
in front of one of the PowerPoint images of his talk.  
 
The painterly image behind them happens to be the result of a project 
called The Next Rembrandt, a collaboration between Microsoft and the 
Rembrandt House Museum of Amsterdam. The image was also used in a 
discussion with John Searle later that year and the project was discussed in 
the paper Artificial Intelligence, Deepfakes and a Future of Ectypes 
(2018b), which is one of his first to focus specifically on issues surrounding 
art.  
Figure 8: Photograph of Prof. Floridi with Dr. Friend, BSA 




The question of forgeries, replicas and artists editions is something which 
Floridi would undoubtedly have been acquainted with, albeit indirectly (see 
Harr, 2006). The 2018 paper opens with a discussion on the concept of 
authenticity in art and mentions the research paper by Elgammal, Kang and 
Den Leeuw proposing a computational approach for the analysis of strokes in 
line drawings (Floridi, 2018b, p.318).  
 
Floridi introduced the term ectype, one of his many neologism throughout 
his writings. Not all these terms are of significance to us here and I shall 






Figure 9: The shifting of perspective (Floridi, 2010c, p.9-10). 





The infosphere is the totality of Being, hence the environment 
constituted by the totality of informational entities, including 
all agents, along with their processes, proprieties, and mutual 
relations. (Floridi 2013, p.65) 
 
The term infosphere came into being around the 1970s (Floridi 2014, p.40-
41). For Floridi, the infosphere should not be viewed as a “virtual 
environment supported by a genuine ‘material’ world” (Floridi 2010c, p.9-
10). Once we interpret the world informationally, the concept could be 
taken to be synonymous with reality (Floridi, 2014, p.40-41). The purpose of 
this neologism is to shift our perspective of the world from a materialist 









































Moreover, this shifts our knowledge of the world to a knowledge of its 
informational structure. Informational ontology is not the same as digital 
ontology: the ultimate nature of reality is not digital and we do not live in a 
universe that is a gigantic computational system (Floridi, 2011, p.316).  
 
Unlike the term cyberspace, the infosphere is all encompassing: it includes 
our offline and analogue spaces of information as well as its many sub-
regions like cyberspace (Floridi, 2010c, p.6; 2013, p.6; 2014, p.40-41).  
 
“[T]he information society is better seen as a neo-
manufacturing society in which raw materials and energy have 
been superseded by data and information, the new digital gold 
and the real source of added value. Not just communication 
and transactions then, but the creation, design, and 
management of information are the keys to the proper 




Another important point to appreciate is that of enveloping. In engineering, 
an envelope is the “space that defines the boundaries within which a robot 
can work successfully” (Floridi, 2014, p.144). The interior space of a 
refrigerator could be seen as its envelope – keeping the door open would 
thus affect its ability to work successfully. As we will later discuss, because 
of the limitations of our current technologies, “enveloping the environment 
into an ICT-friendly infosphere has started pervading aspects of reality… we 
have been enveloping the world around ICT for decades without fully 






This shift inside the infosphere has thus led Floridi to view communication-
based interpretation of the information society (see Luhmann, 2000) as 
being outdated, since the very fabric of our reality is altering (Floridi 2013, 
p.17). This change is what Floridi calls re-ontologizing. Where ontology is to 
be understood as “the world as it appears to, is experienced by and 
interacted with, the agent in question” (Floridi, 2010d, p.277). Not only has 
our recent technology re-engineered the world around us, but it has 
fundamentally transformed our infosphere and our very way of being (see 
Floridi 2010c, P.6 and 2013, p.6). 
 
The most obvious way in which ICTs are re-ontologizing the 
infosphere concerns the transition from analogue to digital 
data and then the ever-increasing growth of our informational 





The term agent is used, because it could be either natural or artificial 
(Floridi 2014, p.94). We are not, however, talking about some futuristic 
cybernetic organism (or Cyborg) that is part human and partly mechanical 
(Floridi, 1999, p.209). Instead, what Floridi has in mind is a view of humans 
as informational organisms (or Inforgs), “mutually connected and embedded 
in an informational environment (the infosphere), which we share with 
other informational agents, both natural and artificial” (Floridi 2014, p.94). 
This is the world where we share an informational environment with Alexa, 
Cortana, Siri and Google Assistant, as much as we do with a cat, dog or the 
odd rodent. And as technology moves further, merging with what was once 
an analogue-offline world of things, we are no longer ever offline, but living 





“[E]very existing entity – humans, other animals, organizations, 
plants, non-living artefacts, electronic objects in cyberspace, 
pieces of intellectual property, stones, Platonic abstractions, 
possible beings, vanished civilisations – can be interpreted as 
potential agents that affect other entities, and as potential 
patients that are affected by other entities” (Ward Bynum, 
2010, p. 37-38). 
 
 
Thus, Floridi’s philosophy can be seen as non-anthropocentric, especially in 
relation to his theory of Information Ethics (see Ward Bynum, 2010, p. 37-
38). As one of many kinds of inforgs, we “may be treated like commodities 
that can be sold and bought on the advertisement market” (Floridi 2014, 
p.98). As commodities of the infosphere, we could end up becoming 
hyperhistorical serfs. 
 
What makes us different from artificial agents is the way we process data. 
“Humans are the only semantic engines available” (Floridi 2014, p.161). We 
never perceive data without any form of interpretation but always in 
semantic context (Floridi 2014, p.161). Artificial agents on the other hand, 
from the basic desktop to the most sophisticated smart technology are 
“syntactic engines, which cannot process meaning (Floridi 2014, p.161). As 
John Searle had argued, “the syntax does not cause the semantics at any 









5.4.3 Level of abstraction 
 
 
How we come to view ourselves as agents sharing an infosphere is through a 
method of abstraction. ‘Level of abstraction’ (LoA) originates “from 
modelling techniques developed in an area of Computer Science, known as 
Formal Methods” (Floridi, 2008c, p.91 and Floridi, 2013, p.30-31). Floridi’s 
use of the concept was developed with a former colleague, Jeff Sanders 
(Floridi, 2013, p.xvii) and an introduction to the concept can be found in the 
works of systems scientist Edsger Dijkstra and David Parnas, a pioneer in 
software engineering (Floridi, 2013, p.29).  
 
The basic premise of the concept is rather simple, and it is significant a way 
of studying a system by abstracting all other variables:  
 
“LoA consists of a collection of observables, each with a well-defined 
possible set of values or outcomes… [e]ach LoA makes possible a 
determinate analysis of the system” (Floridi 2013, p.31).  
 
We can therefore build different models for the same system depending on 
the LoA we choose to describe it because “the choice of the type 
corresponds to a decision about how the phenomenon is to be regarded” 
(Floridi, 2008c, p.91). Following Floridi’s example of how a car battery 






Figure 10: An example of level of abstraction. 
The art buyer 
“The painting is reasonably priced and provides a  
centrepiece amongst the objet d’art in our room.”  
 
The art restorer 
“The painting consists of paint and primer on a  
canvas stretched over a wooden frame, all of  
which are easily replaceable at £500.”  
 
The accountant 
“The painting is valued at £10000, if we insure it  
at £20000, we will double our money if something  




From a philosophical point of view, “specifying the LoA means clarifying, 
from the outset, the range of questions that (a) can be meaningfully asked 
and (b) are answerable in principle” (Floridi, 2011, p.347-348). It “qualifies 
the level at which a system is considered” (Floridi, 2016d, p.52-53). Overall, 
it could be reasoned that “many uninteresting disagreements might be 
clarified, if the various interlocutors could make their LoA explicit and 
precise” (Floridi, 2016d, p.52-53).  
 
LoA could therefore be viewed as “depending on a frame of reference,” but 
Floridi stresses that such a subjective position need not be relativistic, 
where the values are qualified by a point of view, but only relational, where 
the values are not arbitrary so far as we make explicit the LoA (Floridi, 
2016d, p.52-53). It is our frame of reference that changes and not the 




requires a change in our world view. “Such a change is made possible by the 
method of (levels of) abstraction” (Floridi, 2013, p.29). 
 
Floridi explained that relativism could be avoided by embracing the view 
that we can only know our representations of the world (Floridi, 2013, p.3). 
An example of this would be Luhmann’s constructivist approach in Art as a 
Social System (2000). The alternative is to take charge of our conceptual 
constructions, but to avoid relativism, we must accept that constructivism, 
like that of Luhmann’s social systems, is ill-conceived (see Floridi, 2013, 
p.3). Philosophy, for Floridi, is constructionist, and the task of the 
philosopher is that of conceptual design (Floridi, 2013, p.2). The term 
constructionism, according to Floridi, came from the computer scientist 
Seymour Papert and his work on the psychologist Jean Piaget’s 




An example of Floridi’s application of the method of abstraction is the case 
study he made on the concept of presence (2013, p.36-51).  
 
The notion of presence is of great importance to art theory, as it is indeed, 
with philosophy, where “some classic issues… could be easily re-
conceptualized as problems concerning (tele)presence” (2013, p.36).  
 
“Heidegger without the semantics of presence would be 
inconceivable, and Christian theology has been struggling for 
centuries with the idea of omnipresence as one of the most 





Floridi acknowledges Marvin Minsky as having pioneered the study of 
presence (2013, p.34). It is commonly understood as “a type of experience 
of ‘being there’”, especially in relation to some form of mediation (Floridi, 
2013, p.34). 
 
What is unique to Floridi’s analysis is the idea that presence is based on 
successful observation. So, where a local space of observation and a remote 
space of observation is different, that ‘thing’ “observable at a given LoA in 
a local space of observation… is also telepresent in a remote space of 
observation if and only if [the ‘thing’] is also observable in [a remote space 
of observation] at a given LoA” (Floridi, 2013, p.43).  
 
Floridi uses a live television show with a phone-in participation, as a 
common example: whereby speaking through a telephone to the show 
presenter, you are present in your own home and telepresent in the studio 
(through your voice) that you can observe via the television at your home 
and the audience in the show can observe in the studio. The “two LoA may 
but do not have to be identical” (Floridi, 2013, p.43). 
 
Floridi goes on to clarify our understanding of telepistemics, which could be 
“understood as a way of making the observed locally present” (Floridi, 2013, 
p.50). In relation to presence defined as successful observation, making 
something epistemically available locally is completely different from 
“being present in [a] remote space as an entity” (Floridi, 2013, p.47). To 
put it simply, looking through a pair of binoculars doesn’t make you present 
in the space you are seeing, but neither would pulling down a wall between 
the room you are present in and the next. In the latter, according to Floridi, 
you will not become “telepresent in the next room; you are merely present 
in a larger room” (Floridi, 2013, p.47). This is important as, contrary to 
what the term ‘surfing the web’ appears to imply, we are in reality 






Floridi’s insistence that information must be truthful could be deemed 
challenging and further scrutiny of this will be provided in the next chapter. 
Here, I will merely try to clarify the terminologies. 
 
Semantic content is not necessarily semantic information, hence semantic 
content does not have to be truthful (Floridi, 2018c, p.5). “When data are 
well formed and meaningful, the result is… known as semantic content” 
(Floridi, 2010a, p.34).  
 
 
“What matters is… whether that content provides a person 
holding it with the means to give meaning to something and 
embed that meaningful something into a more general 




When semantic content is false, we could simply call it misinformation. 
When the semantic content is an intentional lie, this become disinformation 
(Floridi, 2010a, p.50). As semantic content, semantic information, that is, a 
truthful semantic content, could be instructional or factual (Floridi, 2010a, 
p.34). Semantic content could be factual without being entirely true, like 
that of a false story concerning a situation. We could potentially deduce 
information (that is, elements of truth) out of the story, but the content 
itself remains false. The story is only considered factual semantic 






Furthermore, for semantic information to become knowledge, it must also 
be relevant. So, in order to interact successfully among ourselves and within 
our environment, we need a constant flow of relevant semantic information 
for us to process (Floridi, 2011, p.244).  
 
 
Floridi has recently given us a further neologism – semantic capital. The 
term arrives from Pierre Bourdieu’s categorisation of economic, social and 
cultural capital (Floridi, 2018c, p.1): all of which belong to the “domain of 
production, distribution and consumption of valuable goods, services or 
social positions” (Floridi, 2018c, p.3).  
 
 
“There is a wealth of resources – including… [the] arts… - that 
we produce, curate, consume, transmit, and inherit as humans. 
We use this wealth – which I shall define more precisely as 
semantic capital” (Floridi 2018c, p.1) 
 
 
In a recent symposium, Floridi expressed that semantic capital is what gives 
meaning to and makes sense of our existence, of the reality that surrounds 
us (Floridi, 2018d). It is not the only thing that defines who we are and how 
we see ourselves, “but it is certainly what defines only us” (Floridi, 2018c, 
p.5). By this, he means that animals and artificial agents cannot have 







Animals have narrative “within which meaning is embedded” (Floridi 2018c, 
p.5), but as far as we know, they don’t make sense of their existence. 
Artificial agents can “only handle syntax, not even meaning”, so they 
cannot define who they are on their own terms (Floridi 2018c, p.5). The 
only way an artefact can enrich an experience with an interpretation is if 
we humans use it to make sense of our existence (Floridi, 2018d). So, 
something like a collection of art could be said to give us a sense of meaning 
or help us make sense of the world (Floridi, 2018d).  
 
“Semantic capital is better studied from a multidisciplinary 
perspective, combining cultural studies, hermeneutics, history 




But what we make sense of, could be reinterpreted differently at a later 
date. Nothing in the narrative changes, rather, it is our point of view casting 
a new light on the very thing that has remained the same. Floridi adapts an 
Aristotelian term, Anagorisis, to mean a form of re-adaptation we make to 
ensure that the meaningfulness of the narrative we have in our life is 
consistent (Floridi 2018d).  
 
 
The growth of semantic capital is through its interaction. At its best, it is 
both productive (therefore, creating further usage) and appreciated (as in, 
giving us value). More importantly, the increasing use of smart digital 
technologies to manage and edit our semantic capital could generate new 
forms of semantic capital for us (Floridi 2018c, p.16). This in turn, affects 







The term ectype, as used by Floridi, refers to “a copy that has a special 
relation with its [archetypal] source” (Floridi, 2018b, p.319). They could be 
authentic unoriginal artefacts - where something is made from its source 
but not in the same method, or inauthentic original artefacts – where 
content received is considered as matching, but not arriving from its source 
(see Floridi, 2018b, p.319-320). This is especially relevant with digital 
processing, where a copy is a clone, with all the properties of the original.  
 
When something digital is broken down into elements, its reconstruction 
could bring about something novel. Here, Floridi used The Next Rembrandt 
project as an example. It has all the elements of a Rembrandt depiction of a 
person, but the image is constructed through the “visualisation of data” 
collected from a selection of Rembrandt paintings (see Microsoft News 
Centre Europe, n.d.). 
 
Another example used by Floridi is the vocalisation of John F. Kennedy’s last 
speech through a process of analysing recordings of his speeches and 









6.1 An analysis of interactivity 
 
In the earlier parts of this paper, we saw that the interactive model was 
noted as one of the most radical of communication models. Interactivity, 
however, is perhaps one of the most common misnomers found within the 
world of art.  
Pask was an important figure as he established a more accurate model of 
interactivity through his communication theories. Paul Pangaro (n.d. a) 
described the variety of systems Pask had built; which incorporated ideas of 
cognition, learning and conversation.  
Musicolour was a light show that responded to sound, but the system was 
not of a simple reactive model. The system was designed to respond to 
change, where the value of change had to be constantly evaluated. 
Likewise, in a Paskian model, interaction is defined by higher order goals. 
Hence, participation becomes a conversation between participants as 
opposed to a simple programmed reaction (see Pangaro, n.d. a). Following 
this, Pangaro pointed out that the key to a Paskian model is novelty, since a 
conversation must involve the unexpected, “resulting in an emergence of 
new possibilities” (Pangaro, n.d. b).  
Similar to this Gaugusch and Seaman (2004) reacted to the fact that 
‘interaction,’ as a term, is itself misleading since the prefix ‘inter’ suggests 
a separation. They came up with the replacement term ‘reciprocal action’ 






Participatory models from a host of artists working within the system of fine 
art from the 1990s onwards have led to an excitement demonstrated by 
writers and theorists expounding the rise of interactivity. This labelling has 
occasionally been contended by the artists themselves (see Gillick and 
Bishop, 2006, p.97). Despite this, Coulter-Smith and Coulter-Smith (2006) 
have offered an interesting comparison of interactivity between fine art and 
computer art.  
 
The projects of Rirkrit Tiravanija were used as an example because of their 
inventive simplicity in bringing art into everyday life. Criticism of these 
strategies lay in their lack of any creative game “except the game that the 
artist is playing [with the viewer]” (Coulter-Smith and Coulter-Smith, 2006 
p.173). Because the participants were essentially restricted to simply react 
to a predetermined structure, it was concluded that these actions simply 
referred back to the original language game of Marcel Duchamp. 
 
Coulter-Smith and Coulter-Smith identify the problem of interactional 
models in art within its “tradition focus on the artist-genius” (Coulter-Smith 
and Coulter-Smith, 2006, p.169) and the commodification of the artistic 
product. This perceived function of art severely hinders its attempt at 
encouraging creative involvement.  
 
In a survey conducted by Willats and Kevin Lole (Willats, 1975, p.16), the 
function of art was put to the test by questioning people with indirectly 
formed perceptions of art. What they discovered, was potential conflict in 





“A high proportion of interviewees considered they had a 
painting or sculpture in the home, [but] they did not choose to 
refer or describe it when asked to name an artist…” (Willats, 
1975, p.16). 
Likewise: 
“Having in the main acquired the work of art as either a 
present or buying it, they largely served the function of 
decoration, which affirms the conflict brought about in the 
question concerning intentions of the artist, and how people 
regard works of art” (Willats, 1975, p.16). 
 
Willats saw this as an indication of the failure of traditional visual strategies 
to find a more involving role when compared with the other arts (e.g. 
music). But the surveys, conducted in suburban housing estates, give an 
inaccurate picture of indirectly formed perceptions. The subsequent rise of 
the leisure and tourism industry has distorted the very way art is consumed. 
In doing so, it has triggered the momentum that has helped to create an 
environment that is more involving for the viewer. The question is, has the 
perceived function of art really changed in any way? 
      
Figure 11: Posthumous displays of pieces by Nam June Paik, pioneer of video and 






Pask’s emphasis on conversation could be considered challenging when 
faced with the current level of syntactic engines: Floridi himself has been a 
judge at the annual Loebner Prize, where the latest computer programmes 
are put through the Turing Test (Floridi, et al. 2009). That is not to suggest 
that computers are incapable of conversation, as we are not insisting on a 
processing of semantics, but a model reliant on notions of conversation must 
still be problematic, nonetheless. 
 
Within Floridi’s Routledge handbook of philosophy of information (2016b), 
Thomas-Jones has argued that “interactivity of even the strongest kind can 
be found in decidedly non-digital art context”, but such cases are often 
esoteric in nature (2016, p.376). In digital art, such as video games, she 
explains, strong interactivity is not only common, it is an expected feature 
(Thomas-Jones, 2016, p.376). But is this really interaction that involves 
learning or merely programmed reaction? 
 
Thomas-Jones quoted the work of Dominic McIver Lopes for a definition of 
interactive art, whereby: “a work of art is interactive just in case it 
prescribes that the action of its users help generate its display” (Thomas-
Jones, 2016, p.379, see Lopes, 2010, p.36). She adds that by definition, “a 
sculpture that we have to move around to view… [does] not count as 
interactive… [as our] active engagement… does not constitute the 
generation of the work’s display” (Thomas-Jones, 2016, p.379). But applying 
Lopes’ theory of interactivity to non-digital art would be a mistake, as his 
definition is tailored specifically to computer art (Lopes, 2010, p.36). 
Besides, this view negates the possibility of vandalism as an accepted form 




“The trouble with “interactivity” isn’t that it’s meaningless. 
The real trouble is that it means too much – it means so many 
different things in so many different situations that it’s hard to 
come up with a one-size-fits-all definition” (Lopes, 2010, p.36).  
 
To Lopes, a conversation is interactive but computer art “isn’t interactive in 
that way”, and “[n]either is it much like social interaction, though [some 
computer art] involves social interaction among many users” (Lopes, 2010, 
p.36). 
 
Dominic Preston, writing in Floridi’s journal Philosophy and Technology, is 
concerned with Lopes’ “ambiguity between… cases where a display varies 
over time, and cases where a display varies because there are multiple, 
varied instances of it” in relation to its properties (Preston, 2013, p.270). 
Preston suggested, for sake of clarity, that Lopes’ definition should to speak 
of display type (Preston, 2013, p.271). It is also apparent, Preston 
continues, that although Lopes “goes to some lengths to lay out the 
properties possessed by displays, it is less clear what properties the 
[interactive] artworks themselves bear” (Preston, 2013, p.272). 
 
Within the writings of Floridi, the best definition I could find comes from a 
chapter in Van den Hoven and Weckert’s Information Technology and Moral 
Philosophy (2008): 
A transitional system is interactive when the system and its 
environment (can) act upon each other. Typical examples 
include input or output of a value, or simultaneous engagement 
of an action by both agent and patient – for example 





A similar definition is given in The Ethics of Information (Floridi, 2013, 
p.140), although the example used is that of a robot in a car plant. These 
rather vague explanations of reciprocal action suggest the idea that a level 
of abstraction plays an important role in how we see our interactions (see 
Floridi, 2013, p.30). Interactivity is therefore relational and dependent on a 
specific frame of reference. 
 
In a passage that quotes the writings of Murray, Floridi later identifies the 
three pleasures of digital environments as that of immersion, agency and 
transformation (see Floridi, 2013, p.172). He adds the further pleasure of 
interactivity, as the vision of what defines telepresence in the infosphere 
(Floridi, 2013, p.173).  
 
Interactivity would invariably presuppose a sense of presence, and the shift 
in Floridi’s model of presence to “an external and objective evaluation” 
necessitates a clear definition of the LoA adopted (see Floridi, 2013, p.44). 
To demonstrate this, we can utilise an example of a participatory art by 
Santiago Sierra. In 1988, Sierra hired a truck driver to block off one of 
Mexico City’s busy roads for five minutes (see Sierra, 1998 and Sierra, 2012)  
 
To those travelling along the same route, there would have been no reason 
to believe they were playing a part in a piece of art unless they had prior 
knowledge of the event (for the sake of simplicity, I will ignore the 
likelihood that someone would have a random ‘eureka’ moment and 






This scenario is a piece of art because, from a level of abstraction defined 
by Sierra, it is now something for us to observe. Moreover, the observer 
from the art world ‘sees’ the scenario, at a given level of abstraction, as a 
participatory piece of art, although they are in no way involved in the 
remote event.  
 
From a Floridian perspective of telepistemics, the frustrated drivers, who 
were unknowingly present at the event, has moved to the art observer’s 
local space as visual information, even though such a space is still remote to 
the driver in their car.  
 
Imagine that you were one of the drivers behind the truck, pressing on the 
steering wheel: in the ensuing cacophony of car horns, which form the aural 
element of the event, you have now been abducted into the informational 
space of the art world. This can be seen as a case of an “imposed backward 
presence” (Floridi, 2013, p.51). This informational space is thus created by 
the interaction, but your material space remains the same. You have not 
been transported into the space of the observer as a material entity: 
instead, it is a duplicate of an element of your informational self that you 





6.2 An analysis of veridicality 
 
Let us consider an assemblage titled Clock (One and Five) English and Latin 
version by Joseph Kosuth (see Tate, n.d.). It is a typical assemblage from 
one of his early Proto-Investigation projects influenced by the theories of 
linguistic relativity (see Alley, 1981, p.399). Kosuth has, at times, 
suggested that philosophy could be succeeded by conceptual art (see 
Goldie and Schellerkens, 2007b, p.x), but his understanding of philosophy 
leans rather closer to analysis than Floridi’s approach of design and 
modelling (Wilde, 2007, p.120). Floridi reminds us that “metaphysics is that 
LoA-free zone where anyone can say anything without fear of ever being 
proved wrong as long as the basic law of non-contradiction is respected” 
(Floridi, 2011, p.60). The same could easily be said of art as philosophy. 
Indeed, Sol LeWitt, a contemporary of Kosuth, has commented that 
conceptual artists are more like mystics as the source of their ideas is 
often opaque (see Costello, 2007, p.105). Goldie, however, has maintained 
that such assemblages raise “many interesting philosophical questions about 
representation [and] about tokens and types” and is therefore beneficial to 
the advancement of knowledge and understanding (2007, p.168). 
 
“This work consists of a clock, a photograph of this clock on the 
same scale, and three blown-up photographs of entries from an 
English-Latin dictionary for the words 'time', 'machination' and 
'object'. It is one of a series of works comprising a real object 
such as a clock, a chair or a hammer, together with its 
photograph and one or more entries for words relating to 
descriptions or definitions of it taken from dictionaries (usually 







Typical of the sort of conceptual art from the period, it comes with a list of 
instructions in the form of a certificate, where “[o]wnership was dependent 
on possession of the ‘instructions’” (Alley, 1981, p.399). The assemblage is 
constructed by gallery assistants, following the instructions provided 
whenever it is displayed (see Wilde, 2007, p.129).  
 
“The photographs should be apparently casually push-pinned to 
the wall. Important: if your wall is noticeably different than 
the wall in the photograph of the clock which you received 
then it must be rephotographed. The photo of the clock must 
be identical to the clock and its surrounding wall. The lighting 
and reflections on the clock and in the photo of the clock 
should also be as close as possible.” (Alley, 1981, p.399) 
 
 
Images can have semantic content (see Fallis, 2016, p.335). The 
photograph of the clock and the actual clock may appear the same, but 
hardly anyone would suggest using the photograph to tell the time, even if 
it is more likely to be correct twice a day. In such a scenario, Floridi 
reasons that “one is still informed [of the time],” that is to say, they now 
hold the information, “although one can no longer be said to know the 
time” (Floridi, 2011, p.269-270). The image could be said to affect our 
knowledge, but not constitute semantic information as such (see Floridi 
2011, p.269). Such “accidental truths do not count as disinformation,” as 





As for the actual clock itself, it is merely calculating from the point it was 
activated. We noted earlier that for Floridi, it is only information if it is 
accurate semantic content. Assuming that it was not the intention of the 
clockmaker to mislead, it cannot be considered as disinformation either. In 
his definition of factual semantic information (Floridi, 2010a, p.50), Floridi 
would appear to suggest that “it makes more sense to say that visual 
information is simply more or less accurate” (see Fallis, 2016, p.335). Such 
simplified information is not entirely inaccurate, however. Instead, it 
should be seen as having a high level of abstraction (see Fallis, 2016, 
p.344). As Fallis had pointed out, Floridi suggested that rather than true 
data, we speak of data being veridical “and, like accuracy, veridicality 
comes in degrees” (Fallis, 2016, p.344). 
 
The blow-ups of dictionary entries offer a range of possible types from our 
folk ontology of ‘time’, ‘machination’ and ‘object’. Similarly, within the 
other assemblages in the series, we have ‘Wall’, ‘Tables’, ‘Chairs’, ‘Plants’, 
‘Hammers’, even ‘Mirrors’ and ‘Windows’ to name but a few (see Kosuth, et 
al., 1973).  
 
Let us suppose that an assistant happens to have the dictionary entries 
muddled up. To Kosuth, the display is no longer art, as it contravenes the 
certificate that is said to qualify it as art. In terms of information, if we 
associate the juxtaposition as a reflection that they belong in the same 
category, then we could say that this is misinformation, or holding no 
information at all. But this is where the level of abstraction is of 
importance, as it could hold valuable information to others - in this case, 
it could be the assistant’s comprehension. This is why the “level of 
abstraction at which one is evaluating epistemic relevance need to be kept 





At a given level of abstraction, the system observed is treated as a 
reference model: “We never check semantic information against some fact, 
we check it against other semantic constructs” (Floridi, 2011, p.203-204). 
So, for example, in the case of Joseph Beuys and the myth of being shot 
down as a pilot in the Luftwaffe, the narrative, which his art is constructed 
around supports his work as a system.   
 
Yet, as observed by Carolyn Wilde in Philosophy and Conceptual Art (2007, 
p.132), what is at stake here is not the words - in this case - ‘time’, 
‘machination’ or ‘object’, but “the [very] meaning of the concept of art 
itself.”  
 
Let us imagine that a couple of art tourists are visiting a new city. They 
have a fair knowledge of contemporary art but are not art professionals in 
any form. They wander around and through an error of judgement, mistake 
a perfectly regular phenomenon as art. They later tell their friends, who are 
equally unaware, about their experience and they in turn tells their other 
friends and so on. 
 
This mythic work constructed in the minds of our couple and later 
transmitted to others now operates within the system of art at a certain 
level of abstraction. It does so because the couple, as observers, were 
applying the social codes of the system. The only difference is a practitioner 
has the intention of making others categorize an element as art. The 








When a similar scenario was posed as a question and published online ten 
years ago, viewers suggested all sorts of replies, including one which 
suggested that the true piece of art holds economic value. This is nonsense, 
as we shall see in the next sub-chapter, as what people are willing to pay 
for has little to do with truth-values. 
 
According to Mark Coeckelbergh (2017), writing in Floridi’s journal 
Philosophy and Technology, the above view could be seen as subjective as it 
is socially constructed. “Art is what we call art, what we decide art is, what 
we agree to call art… depending on the individual, or it is a matter of 
collective agreement and institutionalization” (Coeckelbergh, 2017, p.292).  
 





An alternative is the view that “there are objective criteria for deciding 
whether or not something is art” (Coeckelbergh, 2017, p.292). This could be 
a matter of rules to which the art is judged or even a precise definition of 
aesthetic values (see Coeckelbergh, 2017, p.292). 
 
From a Floridian perspective, this could be seen as another matter 
dependent on the level of abstraction. Coming back to our inattentive 
assistant: supposing that, whilst working on a display of Kosuth’s Proto-
Investigations, they now mixed up the photographs, objects and dictionary 
entries. Even if they kept to one of each, there could be numerous 
possibilities. As we discussed earlier, the display would no longer be 
considered genuine, but they are using the very same elements that make 
up the genuine displays. Could this be considered as a new work of art if the 





6.3 An analysis of a possible ectype 
 
 
Art, in whichever shape or form, accrues our semantic capital. As 
informational organisms, we create, curate, consume and further 
communicate art for others to do the same (see Floridi, 2018c, p.1).  
 
According to Evans (2009, p.13), Walter Benjamin’s formulation of early 
Twentieth century filmic montage as “modernist allegory seemed pertinent 
to considerations of appropriation as a new type of double-voiced art [in the 
late 1970s].”  
 
Writing at the height of interest in appropriation art, as exemplified by the 
likes of artists Sherrie Levine, Vicky Alexander and Mike Bidlo, Craig Owens 
observed that work by such artists is “an attempt to use representation 
against itself to challenge its authority, its claim to possess some truth or 
epistemological value” (Owens, 1994, p.88). 
 
Owens believed that the writing of Roland Barthes, especially The Death of 
the Author (1967), was highly relevant to the questioning of originality and 
the active role of the observer (see Evans, 2009, p.13). Artists generate 
images through the reproduction of other images. 
 
By the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, curator 
Nicholas Bourriaud observed that “We can produce a musical work without 
being able to play a single note of music by making use of existing records” 
(Bourriaud, 2002, p.158). He continues to say that “[d]eejay culture denies 
the binary opposition between the proposal of the transmitter and the 
participation of the receiver at the heart of many debates on modern art” 





The value of “‘remix’ as a form of creativity” has meant that what 
constitutes the new has become increasingly flexible (Sandry, 2017, p.308). 
 
But there is something far more interesting emerging from our infosphere 
today. We are not talking of appropriation, where the semantic capital of 
others is taken as something of their own work. Neither are we talking of 
postproduction with its sampling and mixes that attribute to the semantic 
capital of others through (re)presentation. To discuss what we have in mind, 
let us first explore the art of Gordon Matta-Clark. 
 
Matta-Clark was a prolific artist active from the late 1960s until his untimely 
death in 1978. With regards to a history of his life and works, Pamela Lee 
completed her PhD on the subject and has written extensively on the 
subject which readers should refer to (see Lee, 2001). The particular 
project we are interested in here goes by various titles. For sake of 
simplicity, I will refer to this project as Fake Estates (1973-1974).  
 
Fake Estates came to life in late 1973 when Matta-Clark and his assistant 
started purchasing small inaccessible slivers of land from New York auctions:  
 
“They were… left-over properties from an architect’s 
drawing. … Buying them was my own take on the strangeness of 
existing property demarcation lines. Property is so all-
pervasive. Everyone’s notion of ownership is determined by the 






All the deeds, maps and photographs were kept in a box. This was later 
passed on to Norman Fisher, who died a year before Matta-Clark. Taxes 
went unpaid and eventually, the box was returned to his widow, Jane 
Crawford: 
 
“… the box contained many tiny, loose, close-up photos of 
grass and dirt and cement, and innumerable legal documents, I 




As some of his friends vaguely recall, the box containing the documents was 
brought out at some of his loft parties (Matta-Clark, et al., 2005, p.51). 
Others have mentioned that a few of the photographs documenting the 
project were displayed in their artist-run space back in 1974 (see Matta-
Clark, et al., 2005, p.54). The first proper recognition of the project came 
in during the 1985 retrospective at the Museum of Contemporary Art in 
Chicago, where the catalogue listed it as “Fake Estate, illustrated by a 
single map” (Matta-Clark, et al., 2005, p.54). It was only in 1992, with the 
retrospective at the IVAM Centro Julio Gonzalez which toured at the 
Serpentine Gallery in London, that the material was recognised as ‘art’, 
with some documents included in the display and catalogue (see Matta-
Clark, et al., 2005, p.54). 
 
 
According to Pamela Lee, “[his] archives were not in any shape to be 
systematically gone through. What I told [curator] Nancy [Spector] – in 
response to her suspicions/concern about the provenance of the works, 
when they were actually made, and when the objects were assembled – was 




on Jane’s part. She said that she herself had reconstructed the images, and 
then mounted them on whatever support to present as the object. She was 
completely matter-of-fact about her hand in making this into “a work” 
(Matta-Clark, et al., 2005, p.57). 
 
Our concern here is not whether this collection, assembled posthumously 
from Matta-Clark’s original documentation, is art. Here, we are not dealing 
with the historical or materialistic notions of reality but that of information. 
I am more interested in whether we could consider this collection, which 
was later exhibited together for the first time in 2005, as a non-digital 
ectype. 
 
Fake Estates is obviously not a copy: it was assembled from the information 
gathered from its original documentations. But Kennedy’s last speech was 
also constructed from recordings of Kennedy’s voice to the script of the 
speech he would have given. Thorough investigation was made to ensure 
that the right documents from the Matta-Clark archives were presented 
together, just as researchers working at the Rembrandt House Museum 
scanned through multiple paintings to construct their Next Rembrandt. If it 
is to be considered an ectype, what sort of ectype could it be? 
 
If we call it an authentic unoriginal assemblage, then we are saying that it 
was in the style and content of a Matta-Clark - which it could be, since he 
was very flexible with his projects. Then again, we would also be saying that 
it was not original in terms of what he had in mind. This is more difficult to 
prove as stories conflict, but there were mentions of the process he 
envisaged the collection to follow (see Matta-Clark, et al., 2005, p.45). If 
we say it was an inauthentic original assemblage, then we are questioning 





An interesting observation on originality and what is means to be authentic 
was presented by Byung-Chul Han. Han explained that in seventeenth 
century Europe, art from the antiquity were not necessarily “restored in a 
way that was faithful to the original. Instead there was massive intervention 
in these works, changing their appearance” (Han, 2017, p.66). The 
“epistemological value” of what was deemed to be original had later 
rejected the interventions and alterations (Han, 2017, p.66-67). 
 
Han noted that in the Far East, there is the “special practice of persisting 
creation” (Han, 2017, p.30). Using the Terracotta Warriors workshop as an 
example, he demonstrated that what was being produced was not seen as 
forgeries, but a resumption of production (Han, 2017, p.30). This is possible 




Figure 13: Example of fangzhipin at the Dafen Oil Painting Village in Shenzhen 






In Chinese, a copy could be a Fangzhipin (仿製品): this I would translate as 
an ‘imitation’ and Han notes that “the difference from the original is 
obvious” (Han, 2017, p.60). Another version of a copy is fuzhipin (複製品): 
this translates as a ‘duplicate’ and according to Han, they are “exact 
reproductions of the original [and are held in] equal value to the original” 
(Han, 2017, p.60). This notion of duplicate over imitation parallels with the 
concerns of a copy in the digital element of the infosphere, which is where 
Floridi’s examples of ectypes were created. Another concern is that of 
modulation (see Floridi 2014, p.31).  
 
The aim of modulation is not uniqueness, but a form of constructionism that 
allows variations and further modulations (see Han, 2017, p.68). 
 
“The famous Chinese treatise on painting, the Manual of the 
Mustard Seed Garden, contains… component parts from which a 
painting could be composed or indeed assembled” (Han, 2017, 
p.68). 
 
Fake Estates is certainly made up of components: maps, deeds, the 
accumulation of tax notices, photographs, stories and many personal 
accounts. Should the content of the new presentation be seen as an 
imitation of what it had been, a duplicate of what it was, or neither? 
 
There is a further concept which could be of importance to the exploration 
of ectypes, that of Shanzai (山寨): “the Chinese neologism for ‘fake’” (Han, 





“Initially the term was applied to cell phones. Shanzai cell 
phones are forgeries of branded products such as Nokia or 
Samsung. They are sold under names such as Nokir [or] 
Samsing... But they are actually anything but crude forgeries” 
(Han, 2017, p.72). 
 
Han explains that in most cases, shanzhai products are characterized by 
flexibility, where the “new emerges from surprising variations and 
combinations” in the form of a mash-up (Han, 2017, p.72).  
 
Han believes that shanzhai “illustrates a particular type of creativity” (Han, 
2017, p.72). This notion of creativity is important: if Fake Estates is an 
example of an ectype, then what type of creativity is it, indeed, what type 
of creativity is an ectype? 
 
Margaret Boden has explained that “a creative idea is one that is new, 
surprising, and valuable” (Boden, 2007, p.216, also Boden 2010, p.29). 
Boden studied at the Cambridge Language Research Unit where she 
encountered Pask and his computer-aided learning devices (see Floridi, 
2008c, p.2). To Boden, there are two different senses of the new: 
 
P-creativity or involves coming up with a surprising, valuable 
idea that’s new to the person who comes up with it. It doesn’t 
matter how many people have had that idea before. But if a 
new idea is H-creative, that means that (so far as we know) no 
one else has had it before: it has arisen for the first time in 





Boden was talking about human psychology, “where the ‘P’ stands both for 
‘person’ and for ‘psychological’” and ‘H’, that of human history (Boden, 
2007, p.217). If we apply this to the Floridian hyperhistory, P-creativity 
could become A-creativity, where ‘A’ stands for ‘agent’, artificial or 
natural, and H-creativity could become I-creativity, that is, something that 
is novel to the infosphere. So, every instance of creativity in the infosphere 
is also special at an agent level. To paraphrase Boden: “since every [I-
creative] idea is [A-creative] too, we can always ask what type of [A-
creativity] was involved” (Boden, 2007, p.217). 
Boden lists three types of creativity which are involved in generating new 











Figure 14: Diagram showing Boden's three types of creativity (Boden, 2007, p.219). 
“Generation of unfamiliar  
combinations of familiar ideas”; 
“Existing stylistic rules or conventions  
are used to generate novel structures  
(ideas), whose possibility may not have  
been realized before the exploration  
took place”; 
“Some defining dimension of the style,  
or conceptual space, is altered – so that 
structures can now be generated which 











We could argue that psychological-creativity could not be simply relabelled 
as agent-creativity. We can also say that in the case of the Next Rembrandt, 
it was the programmers who chose Rembrandt as an envelope for the 
program. But the question of ectypes is not whether machines can make art. 
This is something which Floridi might call, “old questions” (see Fritt Ord, 
2016). What Floridi was proposing, by introducing the neologism of ectype, 
was a definition of the type of art machines are making. The two examples 
Floridi gave both utilise enormous data sets to achieve a high degree of 
verisimilitude. What Floridi has reminded us is that computers operate 
through syntax with ease on things that would require a skill and 
intelligence for humans, and this is of great importance: 
 
 
“It’s extraordinary ability to do things differently from us – it 
would take intelligence on our side, it doesn’t on the 
computer’s side… We are just realising that a lot of the things 
we do require zero intelligence. Driving a car can be done by a 
totally stupid entity – if it is a computer; in my case, it requires 
some intelligence” Floridi (Fritt Ord, 2016) 
 
 
This is not to say that we will not have human information organisms 
attempting to master skills that a machine could process with ease. After 
all, the art of painting realistically did not die with the advent of 
photography. This emphasis on process could be interpreted as the 
importance of constructionism (see Floridi, 2013, p.173), where the 







To paraphrase a question concerning intelligence by Simon Head, “if 
[machines] do not have [to make art] close as ours, what kind of [art] do 
they have, and should we think of inventing concepts of [art] which 
accommodate what they do?” (Fritt Ord, 2016). 
 
Floridi’s proposal of ectypes could be seen as one of these concepts. What 
really matters is whether, through the interest of rule-based art in the late 
twentieth century (see Rose, 2005), we are to make an envelope for 
computers to make art? 
 
In the case of the Next Rembrandt, it could be yes. With Kennedy’s Last 
Speech, the emphasis is more of a collaboration between the artificial and 
the natural. Floridi has often stressed that working towards a cooperation 






7.1 Replying to the research questions 
 
This research began with the aim of answering questions regarding the 
relevance of Floridi’s Philosophy of Information to the way in which art is 
practiced today. Let us first remind ourselves of the three research 
questions proposed earlier:  
 What are the themes and concepts of Floridi’s philosophy? 
 How do they relate to contemporary art practice? 
 How could Floridi’s philosophy influence future art practice? 
To answer the first two questions, let us take a look at the six key themes 
and concepts, outlined in chapter five, that are of significance to 
contemporary art practice: 
Infosphere 
Firstly, we recognised the shifting of our perspective away from a 
materialist stance and towards an informational one. This highlights 
the informational structure underlying everything around us, including 
analogue data which is still growing, and equally the digital data that 
now surrounds us. By negotiating this shift, we acknowledge that art is 
not just a matter of communication and transaction, but we could be 
actively creating, designing and managing art as data and information.  
Agents/Inforgs 
Secondly, as we become more connected informationally with our 
surroundings, each entity plays an equal part in our existence. We 
humans are no longer seen as the centre of our environment, but what 
makes us different, for now and possibly in the foreseeable future, is 
the way we perceive and process data. Our ability to process meaning 
is what makes us unique compared with syntactic engines, but it is 




processed by an entity that has no awareness of meaning, but when 
meaning is of significance, the human mind, depending on the 
individual, is where we are able to lead. 
 
Level of Abstraction 
The third point is that by abstracting all other variables, we clarify 
what it is we can meaningfully enquire. The constructivist social 
systems thinking of Niklas Luhmann (2000) might have clarified the 
notions of distinctions and the self-maintaining nature of the art 
system. A Floridian constructionism, however, with its emphasis on 
design and modelling, is more suitable for the task of actively 
engaging with art at a creative level.  
This level of abstraction, where meaning is relational, is also the 
source of much confusion, however. In section 6.1, we saw that Floridi 
only offers a simple description of interactivity, as a more accurate 
definition is dependent on the level of abstraction. And yet, the term 
is used freely throughout his text. Elsewhere, and although not a 
subject of this study, Floridi says “there’s no such thing as artificial 
intelligence” (see Fritt Ord, 2016), although he has contributed to 
numerous journal articles about AI as they are situated in the way 
other people use the term. 
 
Presence 
In identifying the notion of presence as successful observation, Floridi 
has suggested the idea of an imposed backward presence. The 
significance of this in art is the recognition of the informational space 
that is further created through interaction. Furthermore, Floridi 
differentiated telepresence from that of telepistemics. This 
distinction thus furthers our awareness of the boundaries between the 





In terms of semantics, the notion of veridicality which qualifies 
semantic content as semantic information is certainly intriguing. As 
already mentioned, Floridi reminds us that, at a given level of 
abstraction, we reference semantic information against other 
semantic constructs. This is what we imply when we consider some 
meaning to be true. In a way, Floridi is reminding us to broaden the 
scope of the definitions we use: he focuses on information, but not 
just in relation to the digital; he talks about interactivity, but his 
attention is not just conversational.  
The idea of building on our semantic capital adds further weight to 
the importance of producing, curating and manage the arts. As 
something which could give meaning to our existence, the importance 
lies in the fact it is meaning which makes us different from other 
informational entities. 
Ectypes 
Finally, we have the neologism of the ectype. A proposal of a concept 
which describes one type of art which machines could be making. 
Because syntactic engines do things differently from us semantic 
engines, it would be unrealistic to assume that the type of art 
produced will be something that we recognise in our human-oriented 
definitions. 
 
To answer the third research question, I would first like to provide a 
summary which situates art from a Floridian perspective: 
Art exists as part of what helps us interpret our existence within a universal 
informational environment that is negotiated by informational entities that 
includes, amongst other things, conscious informational organisms and 




As we saw in section 6.3, Floridi has suggested that our future lies in 
combining the best of humanity with the best of new technology. It is 
through our understanding of our shared informational environment that we 
begin to move forward in our informational era. This is how Floridi’s 
philosophy could influence future art practice, as it is our digital 
environment that will be shaping our very way of being. Through working 
alongside technology, we become co-creators of art and in doing so we can 
create and model further concepts of art. 
In terms of finding examples of art that operate in a way that could be said 
to model or counter Floridi’s ideas, it is important to remember that we are 
retrospectively applying Floridi’s ideas to art that already exists. 
Consequently, we are not implying that the artists chosen held the same 
views as Floridi when their projects came into being. Neither are we 
suggesting that they must be in agreement with his philosophical constructs. 
The work of Stephen Willats is of interest, not only because of his efforts at 
applying cybernetic and informational theories in an attempt to further the 
practice of art. As we have seen in section 5.2, Willats and other artists 
surrounding the Centre for Behavioural Art were designing and modelling 
concepts. Unlike Floridi, however, the false promise of a homeostatic ideal 
provided by Willats is reductionistic in character. 
The examples by Santiago Sierra and Joseph Kosuth are interesting in their 
own right. If we ignore the intention behind the making of such pieces, they 
could easily be used to model many other philosophical ideas. 
With regards to the case of Jane Crawford and the new pieces by Gordon 
Matta-Clark. Fake Estates, along with the many other projects by Matta-
Clark, will always hold a unique place in art history. Peter Fend, who 
worked with Matta-Clark, revealed further projects that were in 
development before his untimely death (see Fend, 1997). It would indeed be 
very interesting to see Matta-Clark’s other ideas developed into fully 
recognised pieces. As to whether we could consider Fake Estates as an 




7.2 Evaluation of this research 
 
Whilst this study is directed at the way in which Floridi’s concept design 
could apply to contemporary art practice, the findings could undoubtedly 
enlighten and help clarify the Philosophy of Information to other fields of 
study. 
However, as this is not a comprehensive survey of his works, there are 
limitations as to the accuracy of the conclusions made thus far.  
At the time of writing, Floridi has announced the publication of the third 
volume in his Foundations of the Philosophy of Information series, with 
another two volumes in progress. Likewise, there are hundreds of journal 
articles, not all of which are entirely relevant, which could add or indeed 
change the themes and concepts identified. 
The awareness of Floridi’s concepts in the arts is something which we have 
not touched upon in this study and it remains as something that is still to be 
understood. Granted it may take some time before this aspect could be 
properly assessed.  
As such, I believe the methodology adopted has been suitable for this study, 
as it provides a cursory glance at an ever-changing informational space 
(both in terms of Floridi’s philosophy and of art) as it progresses towards a 





7.3 Suggestions for further research 
 
Floridi’s proposal of an ectype would suggest that further research could be 
carried out in the creation and modelling of further examples of art making 
that is unique to non-human informational entities. 
Furthermore, through Searle’s emphasise on the difference between 
semantic and syntactic processing, there is the potential to further explore 
the limits of syntactic engines in creating our understanding of art. 
Although I have mentioned it in passing, it would be interesting to expand 
on the differences between Floridi’s Philosophy of Information and the 
social system theories of Niklas Luhmann. The origins of both ways of 
thinking stem from similar fields and yet the outcome is vastly different.  
It is possible that as art practice becomes more informationally entwined, a 
potential role exists for library and information specialists to have a greater 
part in the creation, design and modelling of future art.  
Creative projects like The Next Rembrandt, Jane Crawford’s approach to 
Matta-Clark’s Fake Estates, and even the recreations by Marina Abramović, 
show that art creations are utilising archives, libraries and museum 
collections as a way of furthering the practice of art. As we see more 
projects using new technology to analyse data from collections, information 
professionals are in a unique position to take advantage of this interest in 
data and information. 
Furthering awareness of Floridi’s informational approach amongst those in 
the arts sector could be the first step in creating greater connections 
between the library and information science and art. In doing so, we could 
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When I was first introduced to the works of Luciano Floridi, I was both 
intrigued and confounded by his thinking. I knew I wanted to complete my 
studies with a broad understanding of his works and chose a dissertation 
project that I would find challenging. 
I was very glad to have chosen the part-time dissertation path, as I needed 
time to read, think and analyse his complex themes and concepts. As a 
result, the work plan looked a little different from project proposal, with 
the review of Floridi’s work stretching far beyond October. Much of this was 
down to new publications and talks in the latter part of 2018 that were 
highly relevant to the subject of my research.  
It was not my original intention to attend any of Floridi’s presentations. 
However, I was lucky enough to find a small informal symposium at Exeter 
College, University of Oxford. This turned out to be of great help to my 
research as he explained some of his new ideas and directions. 
Throughout the course of my research, I actually discovered a better 
connection between Floridi and art than I had originally anticipated. I knew 
he was indirectly interested in art history during his studies but was very 
surprised to see the mention of Jenny Holzer in his PhD thesis. Likewise, the 
resources I found regarding the works of Willats and surrounding the Centre 
for Behavioural Art were of tremendous help to me in establishing what I 
needed to find in the writings of Floridi. 
Overall, I believe I have extended my research skills as a result of this study. 
I have also gained a better knowledge of Floridian thinking, as well as 
broadened my understanding of the importance of library and information 
professionals to the art sector. I am confident that all the above will serve 





9.2 Dissertation Proposal 
 
Working Title 
Rethinking Art through Floridi’s approach to information. 
Introduction 
The aim of this project is to explore one of the most fascinating and timely 
thinkers of our digital era, Luciano Floridi. His Philosophy of Information (PI) 
and his thinking surrounding the idea of an infosphere has given practitioners 
within the field of Library and Information Science and Information Technology 
much thought (Bawden and Robinson, 2018, p.2-5). As we become more 
reliant on connected digital devices throughout our daily lives, Floridi has 
engaged in an advisory capacity on the ethical implications of our digital 
onlife, where the lines of being online and offline are blurred. 
Within the field of art, there has been many attempts throughout the 20th and 
subsequently, the 21st century to link scientific and informational theories with 
art theory and practice. This is, in many ways, due to the advancing use of 
technology in art.  
Cutting-edge technology has always influenced the course of art practice. 
Without the invention of portable tubes of paint, for example, we would 
probably experience landscape paintings from the Impressionists quite 
differently. The development of silkscreen printing in the 20th century and its 
adoption to commercial art of the 1950s and 60s had a profound effect on the 
rise of pop art both sides of the Atlantic. This is most evident in the vivid large-
scale prints of Andy Warhol (Rieland, 2014).  
From the post-war periods of the 20th century, we have seen increasing 
collaborations between artists and scientists in exhibitions, such as Software 
(Burnham, 1970) and Cybernetics Serendipity (Reichardt, 1968), to research 




Museum of Art. The most profound effect of the latter could be seen in the 
works of James Turrell (Adcock and Turrell, 1990, p.61-84). 
While artists working with computers, which later evolved into art practice that 
is labelled digital art, is often seen as an obvious link between art and 
information theory, the effects of information theory and its close cousin, 
cybernetic theories have influenced artists from a variety of backgrounds. 
This project will try to re-evaluate this history and see how the thinking of 
Floridi, especially his emphasis on data, could in some way effect the way we 
approach art practice.  
The idea is to find out how art is situated within the infosphere and whether 
there are any current practices which relates to Floridi’s thinking. 
This project rests upon an existing body of study about art practice, pursued 
through a selective literature review of the works of Floridi. It builds upon 
these prior explorations by aiming to situate art practice in relation to 
contemporary informational theories, and by informing the way we view 
contemporary art practice beyond existing theories to include the advances of 
our hyper-historical age. 
Aims and Objectives 
This project aims to review Floridi’s concept of information as a model for art 
theory. There is also lesser secondary aim of finding examples of art that 
operates in a way that could be said to model or counter Floridi’s ideas.  
The objectives of this project are as follows: 
To identify aspects of Floridi’s concepts and ideas and to analysis them to 
determine the key themes and potential problems; 
To compare and contrast the concepts and ideas of Floridi with theories and 
ideas from the field of art as it has been practiced from the late 20th century to 




To establish whether a focus on the ideas and concepts of Floridi could 
influence the development of art practice and whether this is of importance in 
view of the way art is practiced today.  
 
Scope and definition 
The emphasis here will not be limited to artistic outputs that are classed as 
‘digital art’ and includes a look into past attempts at introducing information 
theory to art practice. Moreover, the area of interest could be defined as 
starting from the theories and practice of the post-1960s period, an era 
described by Lucy Lippard as a period of dematerialisation in art practice 
(Lippard, 2007), through the interactions that are said to reflect Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics at the beginning of this century (Bourriaud, 
2002), to present day art practice. 
 
Furthermore, the definition of art will not be limited to any particular style, 
practice or shared qualities other than the fact that something, regardless as 
to whether it is even a thing, has been defined as art. 
 
Although it is an area that will be partially explored, this project will not be 
focused specifically on what Frank Popper has termed ‘technoscience-art’, 
that is, artworks which are established by “scientific methodology and 
technological processes to the extent that the scientific properties… 
constitutes its central idea” (Ahmedien, 2018, p.4).  
 
There are several papers that looks at the development of information theory 
and art, though the majority focuses on its relation to the development of 





In terms of the writings of Floridi, I will start my investigation from some of his 
earliest journal articles dating back to the mid-1990s, working my way through 
his published writings before delving further into works disseminated online. 
At this stage, I will only be surveying works that are written in the English 
language.  
 
Research Context/Literature Review 
The initial phase of this project will start with the earliest of Floridi’s writings 
which examine the role of Scepticism in philosophy. This is to establish the 
foundations of his philosophical approach and to see if there are any recurrent 
themes in his current works. I will then make my way through a selection of 
journal articles he has written, much of which surround the subject of 
information and data. Books and chapters will be the next port of call followed 
by any relevant writings or interviews found online. I will, of course be 
reviewing a selection of relevant secondary sources to help me develop a 
better understanding of his concepts and ideas.  
Having made a cursory glance at the list of his published works on the Oxford 
Internet Institute website, it would appear that Floridi has rarely mentioned art 
in his many papers. He was a keynote speaker at the British Society of 
Aesthetics annual conference in 2016 and I understand he spoke about art 
from an informational point of view, which some attendees found of interest 
(see Floridi, 2016 and Jones, 2016). Floridi is also the editor-in-chief of the 
journal Philosophy and Technology, which had an issue in September 2017 
themed around the rethinking of art in the age of creative machines (see 
Gunkel, 2017). There is a chapter within the Routledge Handbook for 
Philosophy of Information by Katherine Thomson-Jones on Art and the 
information society, but the emphasis is solely on practices labelled as digital 
art (Thomson-Jones, 2016).  
The most notable example of describing art with information models is the 




Luhmann’s Art as a social system as there are strong links between his 
communication concepts and information theory. Likewise, Stephen Willats’ 
Art as Social Function and the early systems related works of Hans Haacke is 
also of relevance in this enquiry. I do not wish to name many artists and 
collaborations at this early stage as I feel it could unintentionally influence the 
path of this investigation.  
I feel the body of literature mentioned above would be a good point of 
departure from which to further the enquiry on the theme of this project. 
Methodology 
This study will take the form of desk research in the sense that I will be 
analysing documents relating to Floridi and art. A critical review will be made 
on selected literature of Floridi with the aim of clarifying some of the terms and 
concepts used and seeing whether it is applicable to art. This has been 
described by Pickard as “a critical discussion of all significant, publicly 
available literature that contributes to the understanding of a subject” (Pickard, 
2007, p.26).  
A selected historical study will be made examining the development of issues 
surrounding art practice of the period described above. Pickard noted that a 
historical analysis is concerned with reconstructing the past, identifying pieces 
of a puzzle and putting them together to provide insight and understanding of 
a situation” (Pickard, 2007, p. 168). Likewise, this phase of the project will not 
be a comprehensive survey of all avenues of art practice but a piecing 
together of parts that could potentially be compared with Floridi’s concepts.  
The reasons behind this choice of methods is that the former will provide the 
conceptual understanding for the second phase of research, whilst the latter 
will help establish a space in which the former could be applied. It is 
envisaged that any assumptions made will be open-ended. The skills required 
in implementing this project will include information seeking and retrieval, 





My objective is to complete the research project to a standard suitable for 
journal publication. Throughout the process of the study, I intend to use twitter 
as a platform to disseminate work-in-progress thoughts and ideas. This is 
more of a way to bring undeveloped concepts out into the open to elicit 
discussion as well as promoting interest in my studies.   
Work Plan 
 
Having approached the writings of Floridi in previous modules, I see that his 
prose, especially his use of analogies, adds to the complexity of the text. I 
have therefore given myself three months to work my way through his 
writings, including any secondary materials and critiques that I might find.  
 
This initial stage will steer the direction of the second phase which involves 
finding and analysing works and theories relating to the field of art.  
 
I intent to start constructing the dissertation from the September period, giving 




writing process by mid-December. This should give me enough time to review 
and amend any issues encountered, ironing out any loose ends.  
 
As this research is not reliant on the collection and analysis of an abundance 
of quantitative data, I do not believe a rigid time plan would be appropriate. 
This idea of keeping to a relatively flexible plan accommodates the encounter 
of any tangent but relevant findings along the way.  
 
Resources 
My intention is to obtain the majority of the relevant information on the 
subjects from web-accessible sources. For printed material, I will be focusing 
my search from libraries and archives within London, as well as nearby cities 
within the UK. 
There is a possibility that I might make use of a Visual Arts Research 
Collection whilst in Canada to source materials related to the North American 
aspect of art development. This will not be an essential part of the research as 
I intent to use materials supporting my analysis from art collections and 
archives within the UK.  




An external ethics committee will not be required as there are no human 
participants in this research project. It is not anticipated that any sensitive 
information will be viewed via the desk research, although this area of enquiry 
may involve the study of blog posts and social media postings. As far as I am 




accessed for this project. Any questionable art forms will not be analysed or 
described in the writing process. 
I will be abiding by the university’s guidance on avoiding academic 
misconduct and plagiarism by providing sufficient citations during the write up 




Due to the nature of this proposed research project, I do not anticipate any 
issues of confidentiality to arise. The literature reviewed will all be readily 
available as published works or repository holdings. In the unlikelihood that a 
working paper becomes accessible, permission will be sought from the 
authors involved before any references will be made. External participants will 
not be required in the process of carrying out this project and there will be no 
use of confidential material. 
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